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Introduction
Many workers are at risk of loosing their job due to involuntary separations from frms.
Traditionally, countries have dealt with those risks through a combination of state-funded
unemployment assistance (or insurance) and firm-funded severance payments. Chile has both
types of programs. The problem with these types of programs is that they have a number of
weaknesses. Unemployment assistance is supposed to help workers who loose their job to
smooth their consumption spending during an unemployment spell. Yet when the
unemployment benefits are large, there may create incentives for the workers to remain
unemployed longer than necessary. This "moral hazard" problem may have been at work in the
rise of unemployment rates and the length of unemployment in European economies.112 As for
severance payments programs, they also have the potential of creating distortions in the labor
market, not only in the relationships between firms and workers, but also between younger and
older workers.
The weaknesses of traditional policies for dealing with unemployment shocks has placed the
reform of social insurance programs at the center of the public policy debate. Unemployment
insurance saving accounts (UISAs) have been proposed as an instrument to protect workers from
the loss in earnings associated with unemployment (e.g., Feldstein and Altman, 1998; Orszag
and Snower, 1997). The idea is to have all workers (and possibly their employers as well)
deposit a share of their monthly incomes into their UISA, with the balance in the account
accruing market interest rates. During an unemployment spell, the workers who would be
eligible to do so could withdraw funds from their individual account. It is only when there
would be no or few funds left in the account that complementary unemployment assistance
allowances would be provided. The fact that the accounts are individualized helps to solve the
moral hazard problem. Moreover, the fact that the contribution system is mandatory also helps
to solve another problem, namely the adverse selection mechanisms through which only some
workers might choose to self-insure, or through which the private insurance firms insuring
workers would try to hand-pick those workers with the lowest risk of being unemployed.
Overall, the objective of UISAs is to set incentives right. Recent proposals for replacing
standard forms of unemployment assistance by UISAs are being implemented in several Latin
American countries (e.g., Brazil and Colombia).
"' Both authors are with the Latin America region at the World Bank. The paper was funded by the World Bank
under the Chile Poverty Assessment and the Regional Study on Public Spending and the Poor in Latin America.
Assistance from Corinne Siaens is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in the paper are those of the
authors and need not represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
112 Beyer (2000) shows that the unemployment duration in Chile is lower than that observed in the OECD, and
especially in Europe. In Chile, the average unemployment spell was 3 months over 1995-97, while in .OECD
countries, more than half of unemployed workers have been unemployed for more than a year (OECD, 1999).
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In Chile, the need to rethink the unemployment protection system is reinforced by the fact that
ihe current mix of unemployment assistance and severance payments does not work properly.
[rhe unemployment assistance benefit provided by the government is of such a small amount
l compared with the minimum wage) that it is insufficient for ensuring adequate protection.
Probably in part because the benefits are so low, only 8 percent of the unemployed get benefits
l(another reason for the low take-up is the fact that only formal sector workers with a certain
length of job tenure are eligible). Under the severance payments system, unemployed workers
^eceive one month of pay for each working year with the firm, up to a limit of eleven months of
pay. The problem is that many of the workers who need support the most when unemployed
because they have few savings are also excluded from the severance payments system because
they lack adequate tenure (this is the case for youths and women)." 3
This paper explores some of the implications of replacing in Chile the current job security
system with UISAs. To motivate the paper, we start in section 2 by presenting evidence as to
the role played by unemployment as a determinant of poverty. Section 3 then discusses the
weaknesses of the current systemn of unemployment protection in Chile (severance payments by
firms and unemployment assistance by the government). Section 4 outlines the theoretical
rationale for UISAs and discusses the main proposal for UISAs made in Chile so far, in July
1999. The section also analyzes the potential impact on the distribution of income of a shift from
the current system to the new one. Section 5 concludes.
Impact of Unemployment on Per Capita Income and Thereby Poverty
Unemployment is a key determinant of poverty in Chile. To motivate the rest of the paper, the
objective of this section is to support this assertion by measuring the marginal impact of
unemployment and other labor market variables on the per capita income of households and
thereby on their probability of being poor. To do so, we use data from the nationally
representative 1998 CASEN survey and linear regressions as indicated in Box 1. The dependant
variable is the logarithm of per capita nominal monetary income (without imputations). Separate
regressions are provided for the urban and rural sectors. Apart from a constant, the regressors
include: (a) the geographic location of the household according to Chile's regions; (b) household
size variables and their square (niumber of infants, children, and adults), whether the household
head is a woman, the age of the head and its square, and whether the head has a spouse or not;
(c) characteristics of the household head, including his/her level of education; whether he/she is
employed, unemployed and searching for work, or not working; his/her sector of activity; his/her
position; whether he/she works in the public sector; the size of the firm in which he/she works;
and whether he/she is underemployed; and (d) the same characteristics for the spouse of the
household head when there is. one.
While the regressions can be used for poverty simulation (the regression results are robust to the
choice of the poverty line), we focus below on the percentage increase in per capita income
associated with household characteristics rather than on the impact on poverty per se. Although
we present below the regression results in separate tables by topic, only one set of regressions
113 Another weakness of Chile's current system is that severance payments can be cumulated with unemployment
assistance. Coloma (2000) has proposed to use the severance payments system as a deductible, in such a way that
the worker who has lost his/her job would not become eligible to receive unemployment benefits during the period
covered by the severance payments.
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with all the relevant exogenous variables were estimated in urban and in rural areas separately.
We discuss subsequently (a) the impact on per capita income of demographic and household
structure variables; (b) the impact of education; and (c) the impact of employment variables,
including the fact of being unemployed.
As indicated in Table 1, per capita income decreases, and thereby poverty increases with the
number of infants and children in the household (negative coefficient estimates, with the
estimates representing the percentage decrease in per capita income associated with the
corresponding variable). While these results make sense, it must be mentioned that they may be
sensitive to the methodological choices made for poverty measurement. 114 It is also worth noting
that after controlling for other household characteristics, female headed households have a level
of per capita income 10 percent below that of male headed households (this type of finding can
be used to justify the implementation of special programs and provisions for women heads of
households; when a women head of household is unemployed, the combination of the loss of
earnings due to the absence of a partner and the woman's own loss is large).
Table 1: Marginal Percentage Increase in Per Capita Income Due to Demographic Variables
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Number of infants -0.105 -0.143 Number of adult squared 0.005 0.009
Number of infants squared -0.002 0.036 Female head -0.108 -0.112
Number of children -0.186 -0.204 Age of the head 0.005 0.034
Number of child squared 0.018 0.017 Age of the head squared -0.001 -0.001
Number of adults -0.047 -0.038 No spouse for the head 0.0 18 0.004
Note: The excluded reference categories are a household with a male head and a spouse.
Source: World Bank staff using: CASEN 1998. NS means not statistically different from zero at the 10% level. Coefficients
underlined are significant at the 10% level. Coefficients not underlined are significant at the 5% level.
The gains from education are substantial. A household with a head having gone to the university
(superior level in table 2) has almost twice the expected level of income of an otherwise similar
household whose head has no education at all. Completing secondary schooling brings in an 70
percent gain versus no schooling. Completing primary school brings in a 30 to 40 percent gain.
There are some differences in the gains for the head in urban and rural areas, probably because
that there are more opportunities for qualified workers in urban. The gains from a well educated
spouse are also large and similar in urban and rural areas, but they are slightly smaller than for
those observed for the head. This is not surprising given that the employment rate for women is
114 By using per capita income as our indicator of well being, we do not allow for economies of scale in the
household, nor for differences in needs between household members. By ruling out economies of scale, we consider
that the needs of a family of eight are-exactly twice the needs of a family of four. With economies of scale, a family
of eight having twice the income of a family of four would be judged better off than the family of four. Thus, not
allowing for economies of scale over-estimates the negative impact of the number of infants and children on
poverty. Moreover, by ruling out differences in needs between household members, we do not consider the fact that
larger households with many children may not have the same needs per capita than smaller households because the
needs of infants and children tend to be lower than those of adults. In other words, our poverty line measures the
cost of basic needs for an "average" individual, but very large families do not consist of average individuals because
infants and children are over-represented in them. Not considering differences in needs also leads to an
overestimation of the impact of the number of infants and children on poverty. Nevertheless, even if corrections
were made to take into account both differences in needs and economies of scale within the household, a larger
number of infants and children would still lead to a higher probability of being poor.
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smaller than for men for all levels of education, so that women use their education endowment
less than men. Another explanation could be that there is gender discrimination in pay, but this
would require further analysis to be established.
Table 2: Marginal Percentage Increase in Per Capita Income Due to Education
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Household head Household spouse
Primary partial 0.398 0.256 Primary partial 0.205 0.325
Primary total 0.365 0.302 Primary total 0.198 0.187
Secondary partial 0.701 0.513 Secondary partial 0.351 0.523
Secondary total 0.651 0.612 Secondary total 0.413 0.506
Superior (university) 0.901 0.814 Superior (university) 0.687 0.789
Note: The excluded reference categories are a household head and a spouse with no education at all.
Source: World Bank staff using CASEN 1998. NS means not statistically different from zero at the 10% level. Coefficients
underlined are significant at the 10% level. Coefficients not underlined are significant at the 5% level.
Employment patterns for the head and the spouse also have a large impact on per capita income
and thereby on poverty. The regression specification enables us to look at various issues (table
3):
* Unemployment: Not surprisingly, having a head or a spouse available for work or searching
for employment has a large negative impact on per capita income in both urban and rural
areas. In most cases, the household suffers from a drop in income of 20 percent as compared
to the case when the head or the spouse is fully employed (these are the excluded reference
categories in the regression). While these results probably overstate the impact of
unemployment on consumption poverty (households may use smoothing strategies in order
to cope with unemployment, and the volatility of consumption expenditures is lower than the
variability of income because households save and borrow), the fact that unemployment can
lead to serious consequences for per capita income is clear. Moreover, households with a
head or spouse not working also tend to have lower levels of income.
* Underemployment: Having a head or spouse working less than 20 hours per week is not
associated with a low level of per capita income, which suggests that many of those who
work few hours can afford to. By contrast, underemployment at the level of 21 to 39 hours
per week is associated with lower per capita income and higher poverty in the case of
households heads, but not for spouses.
* Sector of activity and position held: Having a head or a spouse belonging to the construction,
commerce, service, mining/manufacturing/electricity, or transport sector brings in additional
per capita income as compared to working in agriculture (the excluded reference category).
There is a surprisingly large premium for heads working in the public sector (which is worth
investigating further; note however that the data may not be representative of the public
sector), and a gain in working for a firm with more than 10 employees. Self-employment is
associated with a lower income, and being an employer generates a gain in per capita
income, while unpaid family work is associated with poverty.
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Table 3: Marginal Percentage Increase in Per Capita Income Due to Employment Variables
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Household head Household Spouse
Employment of head Employment of spouse
Available (unemployed) -0.198 -0.029 Available (unemployed) -0.171 -0.187
Searching (unemployed) -0.225 -0.725 Searching (unemployed) -0.154 -0.058
Not working 0.058 -0.517 Not working -0.210 -0.598
Sector of activity of head Sector of activity of spouse
Mining/Manuf./Electricity 0.302 0.388 Mining/Manuf/Electricity 0.042 0.057
Construction 0.528 0.043 Construction 0.617 1.007
Commerce 0.402 0.501 Commerce 0.278 0.175
Transport 0.491 0.684 Transport 0.458 0.256
Services 0.405 0.204 Services 0.391 0.144
Type of employment of head Type of employment of spouse
Self-employed -0.105 -0.540 Self-employed -0.215 -0.290
Employer 0.515 -0.054 Employer 0.304 -0.145
Unpaid family work -0.403 -0.274 UJnpaid family work NS -0.574
Public sector 1.105 2.154 Public sector NS NS
Sizeoffirm> lOpeople 0.104 0.054 Sizeoffirm> lOpeople 0.187 0.214
Underemployment of head Underemployment of spouse
Hours of work per week < 20 0.125 0.154 Hours of work per week < 20 -0.028 0.196
20• hours per week s39 -0.155 -0.256 20• hours per week •39 0.187 0.485
Note: The excluded reference categories are a household head and a spouse fully employed (at work and not underemployed),
and working as wage earners (as opposed to self-employment) in the agriculture sector.
Source: World Bank staff using CASEN 1998. NS means not statistically different from zero at the 10% level. Coefficients
underlined are significant at the 10% level. Coefficients not underlined are significant at the 5% level.
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Box 1: Determinants of Poverty: Categorical or Linear Regressions?
It has become a standard practice to analyze the detertninants of poverty through categorical regressions
M.uch as probits and logits. When using such categorical regressions, it is assumed that the actual (per
capita) income of households divided by the poverty line, which is denoted by the latent variable y*i, is
not observed. We act as if we only know whether a household is poor or not, which is denoted by the
categorical variable y1, which takes the value one if the household is poor, and zero if the household is not
poor. If we denote by Xi the vector of independent variables (including a constant), the model is:
y*i = 'X; + £ with yi = 1 if y*i >O and y; = O if y*i < 0
lJnder the hypothesis of a normal standard distribution for the error term E;, this model can be estimated
as a probit. The probability for a household with characteristics Xi of being poor is given by Prob[yi* >
0]= Prob[P'Xi + es > 0] = Prob [Ej >-P'X1] = F (P'X,) where F denotes the cumulated density of the standard
normal distribution. The marginal imnpact of a change in a continuous variable XA on the probability for
household i of being poor, all other variables being held constant, is f(P'Xi)PA, where f is the standard
normal density. A coefficient ,BA positive (negative) implies a positive (negative) effect of an increase in
ihe corresponding variable on the probability of being poor. The marginal probability variations can be
mneasured for any particular value of the Xi vector since f(3'Xi)1A depends upon Xi. The convention is to
compute the marginal effects at the sample mean. If XA is discrete, its impact on the probability of being
poor can be obtained by comparing the cumulated normal densities at various values.
'he main problem with such categorical regressions is that the estimates are sensitive to specification
*-rrors. With probits, the parameters will be biased if the underlying distribution is not normal. The
ldternative is to use the full information available for the dependant variable (indicator of well-being), and
.o run a regression of the log on the indicator (if its distribution is log normal.) Assume that k*i is the
aormalized indicator divided by the poverty line, so that k*i = y*!/z, where z is the poverty line. A unitary
value for w*i signifies that the household has (per capita) income exactly at the level of the poverty line.
rhen, we can run the following regression:
Log k*i = y'X, + si
From this regression, the probability, of being poor can then be estimated as follows:
Prob[log k*i <0 I Xj] = F[-(y'Xi)/a]
where a is the standard deviation of the error terms and, as before, F is the cumulative density of the
standard norrnal. This does not mean that probit/logit regressions should never be used. Categorical
regressions will typically have better predictive power for classifying households as poor or non-poor.
However, to conduct inference on the impact of variables on poverty, it is better to use linear regression.
Another advantage of linear regressions is that probabilities of being poor can be computed for any
poverty line the analyst whishes to use without having to rerun a new regression for every poverty line.
This is with region-specific poverty lines valid for urban or rural areas as a whole, or for specific
departments within the urban and rural sectors, only the constant and/or the coefficients of the regional
dummy variables in the regression will change, and this happens in a straightforward way.
196 Chile's High Growth Economy: Povertv and Income Distribution. 1987-1998
Weaknesses of Chile's Current Protection System for the Unemployed
A key finding from the previous section is that unemployment for a household head or his spouse
generates a loss of up to 20 percent in the household's per capita income. The unemployment
assistance and severance payments systems that have been in existence for many years in Chile
(see Box 2 for an outline of the history of the two types of programs) are supposed to offset such
losses, but the systems as they function today do not succeed in protecting the unemployed. In
this section, after briefly mentioning some of the limitations of both types of programs in theory,
we discuss their main observed weaknesses.
Unemployment assistance. At the theoretical level, the main critique of unemployment
assistance programs (and more generally, of traditional social insurance programs which are
funded through tax revenues) is that the programs generate moral hazard. As suggested by
Gruber (1997), social assistance and insurance programs can have distorting effects on individual
and firm decision-making. The workers who are laid off may take longer to find new
employment if they benefit from generous allowances which are funded by others. The
employers who are laying off workers regularly may do so because they do not bear the cost of
their decisions. Empirical studies show that these distortions exist, and that they can be sizeable.
There are at least three ways of reducing the likelihood of moral hazard. One possibility is to
make sure that unemployed workers loose part of their earnings when becoming unemployment
(i.e., the unemployment allowances are typically set below the wage previously earned by the
workers). Another possibility is to have the unemployment benefit depending on the past
contributions to the system by the worker. For example, workers who have contributed more to
the system may be entitled to better benefits, and employers who have avoided laying off staff
may see their contributions to the system reduced. A third possibility is to require the
unemployed workers receiving benefits to be actively seeking work and to accept a suitable job
when such a job is offered to them. While the first two methods for reducing the likelihood of
moral hazard can be implemented either publicly or privately, the third method is easier to
implement when a public agency is in charge of monitoring the unemployed.
In Chile, one could argue that the first possibility for reducing the likelihood of moral hazard by
limiting benefits has been taken to such an extreme that today, the problem is not moral hazard
per se, but rather the inadequacy of the benefits and the lack of coverage of the unemployed
population. The deterioration over time in coverage and benefits is shown in table 4, which
provides for the period 1980-1999 the unemployment rate in percentage of the labor force, the
number of workers receiving unemployment assistance, the total outlays for assistance, and the
share of GDP that the outlays represent.
* Low benefits: As shown in table 4, each unemployed worker received US$300 on average in
1998 for the full length of the unemployment spell. By comparison, in June 1998, the
minimum wage was worth US$178 per month, at which time five percent of the labor force
was earning the minimum wage.'"5 Given that only one in five unemployed workers was
115 According to the Economy and Labor Program (PET), in April 1996, the gap between the legal minimum wage
and the minimum monthly wage required to meet basic needs, defined in the government's minimum basket for the
satisfaction of basic needs, was 34.2 percent. That is, the legal minimum wage was CH$58,900 while the salary
required by a worker to satisfy his or her basic needs was $89,538.
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without a job for less than 2 months in the last quarter of 1998 (table 5), it is clear that the
unemployment assistance benefits were low. This can be made more apparent by noting that
in the 1998 CASEN survey, unemployment assistance benefits represent only 0.3 percent of
total income. At the time of the survey, the unemployment assistance benefits were (Chilean
Pesos) CH$17,300 for the first three months of unemployment, CH$11,600 for the next three
months, and CH$8,700 for the next six months, versus a minimum wage of about
CH$80,500. Table 4 clearly shows that there has been over time an erosion in the
unemployment assistance benefits per unemployed worker, with the total outlays for
unemployment assistance representing only 0.01 percent of GDP in 1998, versus 0.23
percent in 1980.
* Low coverage: Figure 1 shows that only 8 percent of all unemployed workers were receiving
benefits in 1998. While this -is a higher share of unemployed workers than in 1994, it is well
below the levels of coverage of the 1980s. The low coverage is due in part to the fact that
only formal workers are eligible, and the decrease in coverage may be accounted for in part
by the strength of the Chilean economy during most of the late 1980s and the 1990s. Still, it
is also possible that the decrease in coverage is due in part to the erosion of the benefits, with
some eligible unemployed workers deciding not to apply for benefits because they do not
believe that the benefits are worth the effort.
Table 4: Unemployment Rate and Unemploy ent Assis tance Outlays in Chile, 1980-1999
Unemp. Number Assistance Outlays as Unemp. Number Assistance Outlays as
rate receiving outlays share of rate receiving outlays share of
(%) assistance (US$M) GDP (%) (°/O) assistance (US$M) GDP (%)
1980 10.40 74,000 56,000 0.23 1990 5.70 33,845 6,000 0.02
1981 11.30 75,000 65,000 0.25 1991 5.30 30,246 6,000 0.02
1982 19.60 131,000 103,000 0.46 1992 4.40 23,432 6,000 0.01
1983 14.60 142,000 95,000 0.43 1993 4.50 19,147 4,000 0.01
1984 13.90 98,000 52,000 0.22 1994 5.90 20,572 6,000 0.01
1985 12.10 97,000 47,000 0.19 1995 4.70 21,282 6,756 0.01
1986 8.80 85,000 31,000 0.12 1996 5.40 21,343 7,234 0.01
1987 7.90 66,051 18,000 0.07 1997 5.30 22,586 7,610 0.01
1988 6.30 51,750 14,000 0.06 1998 6.15 27,290 8,014 0.01
1989 5.30 39,245 9,000 0.03 1 1
Source: Compendios Estadisticos, INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas) and Boletines Mensuales, SSS (Superintendencia de
Seguridad Social).
Table 5: Unenployment Duration in Gender (entries are in percentage)
Duration in Males Females All Duration in Males Females All
months _ months
Total 64.67 35.33 100.00 9-12 4.45 9.21 6.13
< 2 22.38 13.25 19.15 12-24 6.09 13.08 8.56
2-4 36.95 26.05 33.10 24-48 0.79 1.98 1.21
4-7 14.86 15.76 15.18 48+ 0.50 0.27 0.42
7-9 4.61 5.68 4.99 Never work 9.39 14.75 11.28
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas
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Figure 1: Coverage of Unemployment Assistance (sham of
unemployed workers)
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Box 2: Brief Review of the Unemployment Assistance and Severance Payments Systems in Chile
- Unemployment assistance (UA). Three periods can be distinguished in the history of the Chilean
UA system: until 1974, from 1974 to 1982, and after 1982. The main difference between the system that
xisted before 1974 and the system in place between 1974 and 1982 consisted in the fact that the pre-1974
system was formed by different programs for different occupational groups (e.g. private employees,
workers, bank employees, etc). The reform implemented in 1974 (Law Decree 603) led to some level of
harmonization in the eligibility rules and benefits received by workers, and to the extension of the
-overage of the system to all formal sector workers, including those from the public sector who were not
eligible before. The maximum level of the benefits could not be greater than the 90 percent of four times
the minimum wages, nor could it be less than 80 percent of two minimum wages. Differences in funding
and benefits persisted between the private and public sectors. Former public employees were entitled to
75 percent of their last wage, while private sector employees were entitled to 75 percent of the average
wage earned during the six months before they became unemployed. The assistance granted to former
public employees was fully financed by the government, while for former private sector employees, the
assistance was financed in through a two percent tax on wages paid by workers (employers also
contributed, but to a lower extent). One key requirement for eligibility was to have at least 12 months of
tenure/contribution to the system (in continuous or discrete form) in the two years preceding the
unemployment spell. After receiving benefits and finding a new job, a worker had to wait for two years
before being eligible for assistance again.
The UA system was reformed again in March 1982 (Law Decree 150), in part to tighten the
eligibility rules. It was decided that, in order to receive assistance, the reason for being unemployed (i.e.,
fired) was to be beyond the worker's control. The worker also had to be enrolled in the unemployment
records of the social security office as well as of the municipality where she or he belonged. It was also
decided that a worker would no longer receive assistance if he/she were to refuse a job offer from the
Training and Employment National Service, unless the wage offer was less than 50 percent of his/her
previous salary. The eligibility conditions regarding the required previous contributions to the system and
the length of time necessary before being eligible again for assistance were kept unchanged. The
maximum benefits duration was set'at 360 days, with decreasing payments over time. The payments were
set independently of the pre-unemployment wage; Along with the UA, the workers were made eligible for
other benefits such as health and maternal allowances. It was explicitly stated that UA benefits were
incompatible with certain other types of incomes (e.g., workfare under the emergency employment
schemes used during the 1970s and 1980s). UA benefits were also incompatible with benefits such as
allowances received for sick-leave, occupational disease, and work place accidents. One important change
brought by the reform relates to the financing of the system. Since 1982, UA benefits are funded by the
Unemployment Insurance Fund using general tax revenues, without taxes on private firms and workers.
Severance payments. Since April 1966, the Law No. 16455 deters employers to fire workers
without a justified cause. Originally, the system worked as follows. If the layoff was considered unfair by
the court, the employee had to be reinstated, or the employer had to provide a severance payment
equivalent to one month of pay per year of service, with no maximum threshold. If the layoff was
justified, no severance payment had to be provided. In June 1978, the Law Decree No. 2200 reintroduced
employee dismissal as a way of putting an end to an employment contract. The employer could layoff a
worker without providing a specific reason, provided the worker received a severance payment
corresponding to one month of pay for each working year. The rule applied only to workers hired after the
Law Decree took effect. The ability of employers to end contracts was confirmed by the Law No. 18018
of August, but the severance payment was reduced to one month per working year with a five-year limit.
In December 1990, the Law No. 19010 required again that all layoff be justified, and for all workers hired
after August 14, 1981, severance payments were set at one month per working year with a eleven-year
limit. The workers hired before that date keep a severance payment with no maximum year limit.
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Severance Payments. Severance payment systems have a number of virtues. They strengthen
the workers' bargaining position and create an income source for unemployed workers without
depressing labor supply. They help older workers who may loose some of their investment in
human capital when they are laid off because they had specialized in a given area and they have
more difficulty in acquiring new skills. Severance payments also force firms with higher layoff
rates to pay a higher part of the cost of protecting the workers who are laid off, thereby reducing
the cross subsidies which are implicit in traditional unemployment assistance and insurance
mechanisms. In some extreme cases, the firm and the worker may agree to a temporary
separation funded by a partial severance payment allowance, with the promise that the worker
will be hired again when the firm's situation becomes healthier. This may lower the temporary
unemployment that could arise when the firm faces short-term difficult market conditions.
At the same time, despite these interesting features, severance payment systems also have a
number of weaknesses. They may discourage firms from investing in their workers' human
capital since the programs tend to lead to shorter and less formal contracts (this hypothesis,
however, would have to be validated empirically, and other factors may help provide incentives
for firms to invest in human capital). Severance payments may also lead firms to reduce wage
increases. The employment relationship between the firm and the worker may be distorted
because older workers have perverse incentives to induce their layoff and firms have perverse
incentives to promote the worker's resignation instead. Severance payments may reduce labor
mobility, with older workers not seeking otherwise better jobs out of the fear of losing their
accumulated job tenure. The labor market becomes more rigid, so that it cannot adapt well to
during the business cycle, since it becomes more difficult for the firms to adjust their payroll
when the state of the economy require some flexibility. While some severance payment systems
were established in part to provide mandatory savings for retirement, this function is
progressively loosing its importance because public and private social security systems are being
developed. There is also a risk for workers in that it remains uncertain whether the worker will
indeed receive severance payments. The reason leading to a worker's dismissal may also lead to
a denial of benefits. Alternatively, if the firm is in a poor economic situation, the worker may
have to accept a severance payment of lower value than what is stipulated in the law. The firm's
liquidity problem become critical under weak business conditions, which may lead to the
dismissal of workers with less tenure even though these workers may be more productive. The
workers who have not completed the required number of years in the firm when they are laid off
are not eligible for severance payment, so that the system does not provide protection for all.
While Chile's unemployment assistance system has low coverage and low benefits, the problem
with severance payments is rather that the coverage and the benefits tend to differ a lot between
workers.
* Uneven coverage: Mizala et al. (1993) estimated that among formal sector workers, 68
percent of those who might encounter an unemployment spell should be well covered by
the severance payments system, in that they would receive an allowance equal to at least
three months of pay. The workers who are not well covered tend to be young workers (27
percent are between 15 and 24 year of age, and 41 percent are between 25 and 34 year of
age; these two groups represent respectively 16 percent and 35 percent of all formal
workers). These groups are not entitled to large severance payments because they lack
employment tenure since they are at the beginning their professional life.
Chile's High Growth Economy: Povertv and Income Distribution. 1987-1998 201
Uneven benefits: The disparities which are observed in terms of coverage are also observed
in terms of benefits since the benefits are proportional to the tenure of the employee. As
shown in table on average a worker that is laid off would have 6.2 months of severance
payments. Since the average length of unemployment is about 3 months, the average
worker benefits from a small rent and does not necessarily face hardship during an
unemployment spell. However, in the case of young workers, the average number of years
worked does not provide for a generous severance package. Some of the workers above 35
year of age also lack good severance packages because they have recently changed job or
because they found their job after an unemployment spell. Since female workers are over-
represented in this last group, they would tend to gain from a reform of the system.
Table 6: Tenure at the Current Job by Gender and Age Group
(;ender 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 654 Total
blales 1.7 3.8 7.5 11.7 14.5 15.5 6.7
Females 1.7 3.7 5.8 11.1 13.9 9.1 5.0
l'otal 1.7 3.8 7.0 11.6 14.4 14.9 6.2
Source: Mizala et al. (1993).
The Rationale for Unemployment Insurance Savings Account
Plroblems with Private Insurance Markets. It was mentioned earlier that a number of
rnechanisms can be used to reduce the moral hazard problems faced by traditional
unemployment insurance systems. If policy makers want to go beyond these mechanisms for
teducing moral hazard, a more radical idea is to promote a shift to private insurance markets for
the consumption smoothing of unemployed workers. The suggestion is that workers could pay
insurance premiums in order to be entitled to unemployment benefits when unemployed. The
workers would select their insurer privately, and the insurance market would ensure an
appropriate costing of the insurance premiums. There are, however, three problems with this
solution: the potential for adverse selection on the part of the worker and the insurer, the inability
ior private insurers to diversify risk, and the inability for the government to redistribute income
with equity objectives in mind.
Adverse selection: There are two types of adverse selection, on the part of workers and
insurers.
Workers: First, there is a possibility that only those workers who are likely to loose their job
will want to insure. This implies that the premium that these workers will have to pay will be
larger than what they would have had to contribute under a mandatory contribution system,
so that the mechanisms of soiidarity between workers will be reduced. This is why in most
state-sponsored insurance programs, the participation of all workers is required. The
compulsory participation prevents the opting out of the insurance coverage by the individuals
who believe themselves to be low risk. A comparable but not identical outcome could be
achieved with private sector provision by requiring that all labor market participants to carry
at least some minimum level of insurance.
* Insurers: Second, on the part of the insurer, there is an incentive to insure only those workers
who are less likely to be unemployed. This may lead to "cream-skimming" and to the
rejection from the insurance system of those workers who need insurance the most. Also,
given the fact that there is asymmetric information between the worker and the insurer (the
worker knows better what his/her probability of becoming unemployed is), some workers
who would qualify for participating in the system could be excluded, while others who would
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not qualify if the insurer had perfect information could be able to participate. This could lead
to a sub-optimal pricing structure for the premiums, and the premiums could be higher
because the insurer would face a higher risk due to the imperfect information at its disposal.
Finally, in order to reduce their risk exposure on an individual basis, private companies may
be unwilling to offer insurance against the risk of unemployment except under very narrowly
specified circumstances.
Systematic risk: Due to the business cycle, the risk of unemployment is positively correlated
across members of the labor force so that pooling many workers within the same insurance
system need not lead to a substantial reduction in the aggregate risk faced by the insurer. To
say this differently, unemployment is a largely non-diversifiable risk, except over time. This
may lead to a failure of private insurance markets to provide adequate coverage and benefits
during recessions. Although fully developed private insurance markets may not exist for the
above reasons, it would be a mistake to assume that there are no private market responses at
all to respond to the demand for insurance among workers. Firms may be able to insure their
employees to some degree, thereby shifting the risk from the labor market to the capital
market, where it can be handled more readily via portfolio diversification by shareholders.
This is the central insight of implicit contract theory, whereby in exchange for offering
relatively stable employment, the firm can afford to pay a lower wage.'16 Yet even successful
firms may not be able to fully protect their workers during a recession. Because of their
softer budget constraint (and the pressure of public opinion to provide public support when
needed), publicly funded insurance mechanisms may be more apt to diversify the risks across
time than both insurance companies and employers.
The upshot of the above discussion is that public interventions in markets characterized by moral
hazard, adverse selection, and systematic risk can have positive impacts on social welfare.
Whether a specific intervention will be beneficial depends on the intervention's design (Green
and Riddell, 1993). That is, when policy makers consider the design of social insurance
programs, they must weight various factors. For example, while increasing program generosity
may lead to increased distortions in behavior, it may also lead to better consumption smoothing,
and the gains from consumption smoothing must be weighted carefully against the potential for
behavioral distortions in assessing the optimal benefits.
Design of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts. In the specific case of a system of
unemployment insurance saving accounts (UISA), workers have individualized accounts to
which they contribute in periods of employment and from which they draw funds when they are
unemployed. Interest payments are credited or debited to their account, depending on its balance
(see, for example, the simulations done by Feldstein and Altman, 1998, for the US economy.) A
typical design for UISAs should specify the rate of contribution to the system, the limits and
rules for drawing funds, the limits on total liability, and the interest rate applied to balances. The
main advantage of UISA's is that by internalizing the cost of remaining unemployed (or
becoming unemployed), employment incentives are improved. This is particularly true for
workers with lower unemployment risk, who are more likely to retire with positive balances in
116 If employees are more risk averse that the owners of firms, which is likely given that human capital risks are
difficult to diversify, both the employee and the firm can benefit from such an arrangement. In effect, the
employment contract, whether explicit or implicit, involves two transactions: a transaction for the labor services
provided by the employee, and an employment insurance provided by the employer. In general, the employer will
be better able to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems than a private insurance company.
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their UISAs if they manage to avoid unemployment spells. The more likely it is that the system
will result in positive final balances, the better the incentives are for keeping jobs and searching
for employment opportunities while unemployed. This is because under the UISA system, the
incentive to find a new job and to shorten the unemployment spell as much as possible is the fact
that any withdrawal decreases the individual's net worth (assets and income), something which
does not happen with the more traditional unemployment insurance schemes. " 7
Feldstein and Altman (1998) and Orszag and Snower (1997) have discussed whether UISAs
would be appropriate for the US economy. In the proposal made by Feldstein and Altman
(1998), workers would contribute roughly 4 percent of their wages to their UISA (there could be
some variation in the contribution rate depending on the wage level of the individual), and they
would be allowed to withdraw funds under rules yielding benefits similar to those provided by
the system of unemployment insurance currently in place (i.e., the wage replacement ratio would
be at about 50 percent, with a time limit of six months). Market-based interest rates would be
applied to the balance in the accounts, and negative balances would be allowed (i.e., if the
account is exhausted, the government lends money to the account). Those workers reaching
retirement with a negative balances would be forgiven. Positive UISA balances could be
converted into retirement income or bequeathed if the individual dies before retirement age.
The key empirical question is whether UISA accounts based on a moderate savings rate can
finance a significant share of unemployment payments, or whether the concentration of
unemployment among a relatively small number of individuals would force these workers to rely
on government benefits with the same adverse effects that characterize the more traditional
unemployment insurance. Feldstein and Altman (1998) used the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) surveys to simulate a UISA system over a 25 year historic period (1967-1992).
Their analysis indicates that even among the individuals who experience unemployment, most
would have positive account balances at the end of their unemployment spell. Although about
half of the benefit dollars would go to individuals whose account balance is negative at the end
of their working life, less than one third of the benefits would go to individuals who also have
negative account balances when unemployed. The cost to taxpayers of forgiving the negative
balances was estimated to be less than half the cost of the current system. Since the simulations
took as given the behavior of workers under the current system, the magnitude of the negative
balances may be overestimated, so that the savings could be even larger for tax payers.
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts in Chile
The Law Adopted by Congress in April 2001. This section reviews the characteristics of the
"PROYECTO DE LEY QUE ESTABLECE UN SEGURO DE DESEMPLEO - LEY NUM.
19.728", (hereafter denoted as the law), an unemployed-worker-job-security-program which is
similar to an unemployment insurance savings account. The law was approved by the Chilean
Congress in April 2001.
* Funding: The UISAs are financed with contributions from workers (0.6 percent of the gross
wage) and employers (2.4 percent of the gross wage). This is specified in Article 5. For
collection and tax purposes, the contributions are treated as social security payments, and
117 At the extreme, when the rate of contribution to the individual account nears zero, we have the traditional
unemployment insurance system. As the rate of contribution to the individual account increases, and the likelihood
of negative balances due to unemployment falls, the system becomes closer to self-insurance for retirement.
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they are applied to the gross wage up to a maximum of 90 UF..8 (about CH$1,400,000 or
US$2,500) per month. Workers with more than one job pay the tax for each wage they earn
and the various employers pay as well for each contract that a worker may have with them.
The maximum period for making payments into the system is 11 years. Out of the 2.4 percent
of the gross wage contributed by the employer, 1.6 percent goes to the UISA and 0.8 percent
is pooled into a unemployment assistance fund which intervenes when the worker fulfills
various requirements (this is explained below). The unemployment assistance fund is
complemented by government transfer of about US$ 10.5 million per year (at the current
exchange rate of CP$600/US$). The government transfer is funded from general tax
revenues.
* Coverage: To be eligible for benefits when unemployed, the workers must have lost their job
due to one of the reasons specified in the law, with reference to the labor code."19
Essentially, the worker may not have been at fault in order to receive the benefits. Each
worker cannot receive benefits more than twice within a period of 5 years. Workers must also
have made a minimum of twelve monthly contributions to the system in order to be eligible
for benefits (these contributions do not need to have been made continuously).
* Withdrawals from the UISA when unemployed: When unemployed, the workers may
withdraw funds from their UISA. If the worker loses his job due to one of the reasons
specified in the law, he/she is entitled to a number of withdrawals from his/her account
corresponding to the number of years of contribution, with a maximum of five withdrawals.
For workers entitled to more that one withdrawal, the amount of the first withdrawal is
obtained by dividing the balance available in the UISA by a factor that varies depending on
the number of withdrawals the worker is entitled to (the factor is equal to 1.9 for two
withdrawals, 2.7 for three, 3.4 for four and 4.0 for five). The amounts for the remaining
withdrawals are computed in proportion to the amount of the first withdrawal (90% for the
second withdrawal, 80% for the third, and 70% for the fourth). The fifth and last withdrawal
corresponds to whatever is left in the account. Depending on the reason for the lay-off, the
worker may or may not receive severance pay, and this will affect the withdrawals allowed
from the account. Once the worker gets a new job, he/she is entitled to one last withdrawal,
but he/she may also decide to keep the corresponding amount in his/her account. 120
* Other withdrawals, retirement and death: If the account holder dies, the balance of the
account passes to whomever the worker has designated for this purpose under his contract
with the entity managing his/her account. If no one has been designated by the worker, the
balance is allocated according to Article 60, No 2 of the Labor Code. If the holder retires, he
can freely dispose of the funds.
* Withdrawals from the public fund:. The employer and Government contributions, as
specified in Article 5, are pooled in a fund which can be used by those 1) who have made at
least 12 monthly contributions to their account, 2) who have been laid off due to one of the
reasons mentioned in Article 159, No 6 or Article 161 of the Labor Code, and 3) whose
X Unidad de Fomento, a standard measure of real living costs.
19 Workers must have lost their job due to one of the reasons mentioned in the Labor Code in Articles 159, 160, 161
171 (N°I), with the exception of the reasons specified in Article 159, N04 and N°S.
120 Under a previous version of the law (known as PROTRAC), a potentially serious problem was the fact that if a
worker changed job, he had the possibility of withdrawing the full balance of the funds from the UISA
corresponding to his previous job. Of course, the worker could in principle keep the fund in his UISA, but he has no
incentive to do so. This is not feasible anymore under the new law, since the worker may only retrieve an amount
corresponding to one more month of benefits once he/she finds a new job.
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account balance is not sufficient to obtain a predetermined monthly payment stipulated by
the law. The predetermined monthly payment is a function the wage earned during the last 12
months of work and is described in Article 25. There are ceilings and floors to the assistance
provided, so that the better off do not receive large sums of the money, and those who had
low wages do not fall below a subsistence level.
* Administration: The collection and payment business is awarded by a public auction to one
entity that can be national or international, but must be incorporated in Chile. This entity wvill
run both the unemployment individual accounts and the public assistance fund. The entity is
supervised by the Superintendence of Pension Funds (SAFP). The contract is awarded taking
into account the proposed fee structure, adjustments, and technical conditions.
Limits of the New System. The law has a number of interesting features in terms of providing
adequate incentives for workers. At the same time, it has weaknesses as well, which may not be
easy to avoid.
* Forced savings and lack offlexibility to account for the heterogeneity among workers: Some
workers have stronger short term liquidity constraints and/or higher inter-temporal discount
rates than other workers. In a private insurance market, the workers would be free to save as
they wish in order to smooth their consumption over time. Those workers who would not
save would do so either because: they do not value the implicit insurance that the savings
provide, or because they face liquidity constraints and high discount rates. When the same
savings rate is imposed on all workers, the system is in theory (an in the absence of
externalities) inferior to a private unemployment insurance scheme whereby all workers
optimize their consumption pattern over time. However, one of the main reasons to justify a
compulsory saving scheme is to avoid externalities such as the fact that workers without
savings impose a tax on their relatives and society as a whole. Still, poor workers tend to
typically have larger liquidity constraints and higher inter-temporal discount rates, so that
there remains a question as to whether the same savings pattern for all is optimal or not.
* Long-tern unemployment for comparatively poorer workers: The compulsory saving and
unemployment assistance system specified by the law does not guarantee the financing of a
specific unemployment spell. While it is implicitly recognized that it could be necessary to
finance unemployment spells of 5 months or more, the only way to do this is to combine
large balances in the UISAs and possibly severance payments. Yet the workers who tend to
be poorer and who need assistance the most also tend to have shorter job tenures, so that they
will not be well protected under the revised system. Comparatively poorer worker with
longer unemployment spells may also lack human capital, in which case the balances
accumulated in their UISAs will be even lower simply because their expected wage will also
be lower. There may be a need to reinforce the unemployment assistance benefits for these
workers, but this may not be feasible if they lack a voice in the debate."'2
* Bargaining power and severance payments: It is not clear what the effect of UISAs could be
on the workers' bargaining power. On one hand, the workers would have available funds to
protect them from unemployment, and this could improve their bargaining power. On the
other hand, if the contribution of firms to the UISA was funded through a reduction in
severance payments, the marginal cost of firing workers for the firms would be reduced.
121 Orszag and Snower (1997) explore the possibility by the government to implement balanced-budget
redistribution among the unemployment saving accounts by taxing the contributions of the rich and subsidizing
those of the poor.
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* Political economy: Because the unemployment insurance savings account would be
compulsory, the cost of the new system(at 2 to 3 percent of GDP) would appear to be much
higher than the cost of the current unemployment assistance system (at 0.01 percent of GDP).
Although the balances in the UISAs belong to the workers, the system may be perceived as
an additional tax, and this may generate opposition. At the administrative level, the logistics
involved in a UISA system would be more complex, and therefore more costly, than those
involved in the current assistance system.
Distributional Impact. In this last sub-section, our objective is to assess the distributional
impact of shifting from Chile's current system of unemployment assistance to a system of
UISAs. To do so, we use the method described in Box 3. For each program, the method will
yield two key parameters: the GIE (Gini income elasticity) for the benefits of the program, and
the GIE for the taxes through which the program is funded. The interpretation of the GIE in
terms of the redistributive impact of a policy differs for benefits and taxes.
* Interpretation of a GIE for a program benefit: If the GIE of a program (unemployment
assistance or UISAs) is equal to one, a marginal increase in the benefits will not affect the
Gini coefficient in after-tax after-benefit per capita income, and thereby the effect on
inequality can be considered as neutral (no change). If the GIE is less (greater) than one,
then an increase in program benefits will decrease (increase) the Gini of income, and thereby
increase (decrease) inequality. The smaller the GIE, the larger the redistributive impact of
the program and the gains in inequality.
* Interpretation of a GIE for a tax: The rules for taxes are reversed as compared to the rules for
programs. If the GIE is less (greater) than one, then an increase in tax revenues will increase
(decrease) the Gini of income, and thereby decrease (increase) inequality. The larger the
GIE, the larger the redistributive impact of the tax and the gains in inequality. If the GIE of a
tax is equal to one, a marginal increase in the tax will not affect the Gini coefficient in after-
tax after-benefit per capita income, and thereby the effect on inequality can be considered as
neutral (no change).
* Combining the two GIEs: Since the GIE is estimated for a dollar spent on the program, or a
dollar raised in taxes, we can compare programs and taxes which are of different scale in
terms of outlays or revenues. This means that we can compare the GTEs of unemployment
assistance and of UISAs, as well as the GIEs of the taxes raised to fund the two programs, in
order to find the overall impact on social welfare of shifting at the margin from one type of
protection of the unemployed to the other.
Two parameters must be estimated to assess the redistributive impact of the current system: the
GIE for unemployment assistance, and the GIE for the general tax revenues used to fund the
benefits.
* GIE for the current system of unemployment assistance: This elasticity was estimated using
data from the 1998 nationally representative CASEN survey. It is equal to -0.84, which is
highly redistributive. This is not surprising since the take-up of the program is higher among
those who have few other resources to cope with the loss of earnings generated by
unemployment.
* GIE for the general tax revenues used to fund the current system: Using information from
Engel et al. (1998), we estimated that the GIE for general tax revenues was 0.90 in 1996 (the
current tax system is regressive since the elasticity is smaller than one). Although the income
tax is progressive (i.e., the rich pay a higher share of their income in tax, with a GIE of 1.73),
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the VAT is regressive, with an elasticity of 0.79, and other taxes are also regressive, with a
GIE of 0.90. The weighted combination of the elasticities for the three types of taxes yields
an overall GIE for tax revenues of 0.90.
* Combining both estimates: As explained in Box 3, all what one has to do to assess the impact
of the current system per dollar spent on benefits (and raised in taxes) is to sum the impacts
from the benefits and the taxes, which each impact being to the relevant elasticity minus one.
For the current system, this yields a marginal impact on inequality proportional to (-0.84-1)-
(0.90-1) = -1.74.
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Box 3: Analyzing the Impact of the Reform of Unemployment Benefits on Inequality
To analyze the distributional impact of the transition from unemployment assistance to
unemployment insurance savings accounts in Chile, we use a source decomposition of the Gini index of
inequality proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985, 1994). Denote total pre-tax per capita income by y,
the cumulative distribution function for total per capita income by F(y), and the mean total per capita
income across all households by gy. The Gini index of inequality can be decomposed as follows:
Gy = 2 cov [y, F(y)j/,uy = X, SsR,Gj
where Gy is the Gini index for total income, G1 is the Gini index for income y, from source i, Si =
,j.t/,y is the share of total income obtained from source i, and R- is the Gini correlation between income
from source i and total income. The Gini correlation is defined as R, = cov [yj, F(y)] / cov[(yi, F(yi)],
where F(y;) is the cumulative distribution function of per capita income from source i. The Gini
correlation R; can take values between -1 and 1. Income from sources such as income from capital which
tend to be strongly and positively correlated with total income will have large positive Gini correlations.
Income from sources such as unemployment benefits tend to have smaller, and possibly negative Gini
correlations. The overall (absolute) contribution of a source of income i to the inequality in total per
capita income is thus SiR4G;. The above source decomposition provides a simple way to assess the impact
on the inequality in total income of a marginal percentage change equal for all households in the income
from a particular source. As proven by Stark et al. (1986), the impact of increasing for all households the
income from source i in such a way that y; is multiplied by (1 + e;) where e; tends to zero, is:
&i = Si (RiGi - GY )
This equation can be rewritten to show that the percentage change in inequality due to a marginal
percentage change in the income from source i is equal to that source's contribution to the Gini minus its
contribution to total income. In other words, at the marginal level, what matters for evaluating the
redistributive impact of income sources is not their Gini, but rather the product RIG, which is called the
pseudo Gini. Alternatively, denoting by rji = RjG1/Gy the so-called Gini elasticity of income for source i,
the marginal impact of a percentage change in income from source i identical for all households on the
Gini for total income in percentage terms can be expressed as:
G, /G; = SiRGi _S =-Si(i _-1)
Thus a percentage increase in the income from a source with a Gini elasticity Tm; smaller (larger)
than one will decrease (increase) the inequality in per capita income. The lower the Gini elasticity, the
larger the redistributive impact. When conducting policy simulations for the marginal impact on
inequality of changes in various income sources, it is easiest to consider the impact on the Gini per dollar
or peso spent (or taxed), because that marginal impact is directly proportional to (pi-l). All what one has
to do is to sum the impacts from the various sources one by one, with each impact being equal to the
relevant elasticity minus one. For example, in the case study analyzed in the main text, we have two
elasticities for the current system: (a) the GIE for the current system of unemployment assistance is -0.84;
and (b) the GTE for the general tax revenues used to fund the current system: 0.90 As a result, the
marginal impact on inequality of the current system is (-0.84-1)-(0.90-1)-1l.74. Under the new system,
the GEE for the UISA-based assistance is -0.46 and the GIE for tax revenues on formal sector wages is
1.00, so that the total impact at the margin is -1.46. Under the assumptions made for the estimates, the
new system would be less redistributive than the current system, but it would still be highly redistributive.
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There are also two parameters which must be estimated empirically to assess the redistributive
impact of the new system: the GIE for the publicly funded unemployment allowance received by
workers once they have depleted or exhausted their UISA, and the GIE for the tax on formal
sector wages used to fund not only the UISA, but also the unemployment assistance benefits
once the UISA has been used.
* GIE for the UISA-based system of unemployment assistance: To estimate this parameter
adequately, we would need to forecast the probability of being unemployed for formal sector
workers, their expected balance in the USIA when becoming unemployed, and their expected
public unemployment assistance once the unemployed workers are eligible. This is a
difficult task. As a proxy, we can use a GIE representing the position in the income
distribution of those unemployed workers whom belonged to the formal sector before
becoming unemployed. While the previous sector of employment of the unemployed is not
given in the 1998 CASEN, it is part of the information provided in the 1997 "Encuesta
Nacional de Empleo". Using this survey, we found a GIE of -0.46. Note that the
simplification used to compute the GIE assumes that all the workers who are unemployed
and who belonged to the formal sector have the same expected benefit from unemployment
assistance after they deplete or exhaust the funds available in their UISA. While the
unemployment assistance provided under the USIA system would still be redistributive (the
elasticity is less than one), it would be less redistributive than the current system per dollar
spent, essentially because in the new system, we implicitly assume that the take-up would not
be limited to the poorest.
* GIE for the current system of unemployment assistance: Since the taxes that would fund the
UISA system are proportional to the wages of formal sector workers, the elasticity for the
taxes is equal to the elasticity for the source of income represented by these wages. It turns
out that the elasticity is equal to one, so that on the taxation side, the taxes for the USIA have
no impact on inequality.
* Combining both estimates: Given that under the new system, the GIE for the UISA-based
assistance would be -0.46 and the GIE for tax revenues on formal sector wages would be
1.00, the total impact at the margin is proportional to -1.46. Under the simple assumptions
made for the estimates, the new system would be less redistributive than the current system,
but it would still be highly redistributive.
Conclusion
Unemployment is one of the key determinants of poverty in Chile. When a household the head
or its spouse is unemployed, the per capita income of the household is reduced by up to 20
percent (up to 40 percent when both the head and the spouse are unemployed). The policy
makers involved in the design of unemployment protection systems must deal with a number of
trade-offs. At one extreme, when no unemployment assistance or insurance is provided, the
unemployed workers must rely on self-insurance through precautionary savings or informal
lending channels, such as loans or gifts from relative or friends, in order to smooth their
consumption. At the other extreme, one can, fund generous government-sponsored
unemployment assistance systems, where a worker's contribution is independent of the benefits
received. While the proposals for reform discussed in the literature fall somewhere in between,
depending on the specific parameters chosen, moving from a traditional unemployment
assistance and severance payments system to UISAs does change substantially the incentives
faced by workers.
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In Chile, under the current system, the workers receive (rather small) unemployment benefits
upon losing their jobs, and potentially larger severance payments. They lose the unemployment
benefits when they find a new job, but they keep the severance payments. The unemployment
benefits are financed through general tax revenues, while the severance payments are financed
by firms. The main problem with the unemployment assistance system is less related to the
potential moral hazard that the system might create than to the low value of the unemployment
benefits and the low coverage of the program among the unemployed. The main problem with
the severance payments system is the fact that the coverage and benefits are uneven, to the
detriment of poorer and younger worker as well as women.
Under the UISA system, the workers would receive no "reward" upon losing their jobs, and they
would suffer no "penalty" for finding jobs quickly. Each employed worker would make a fixed
mandatory minimum contribution to his/her UISA each month, and additional voluntary
contributions above the mandatory minimum levels would be permitted. Upon becoming
unemployed, an individual worker would be entitled to withdraw a fixed maximum amount per
month from his or her UISA (smaller withdrawals would also be permitted). When the
individual's UISA balance falls to zero, or is seriously depleted, he/she would be entitled to
unemployment assistance. The unemployment assistance would be financed through a tax levied
on all wage earners. When workers would retire with a positive balance in their UISA, they
would be able to use the balances to top their pensions. Overall, the workers themselves would
play a much larger role in the financing their own support during periods of unemployment
(Guasch, 2000).
The main advantage of UISAs is that they tend to set the incentives right, without creating
distortions in the behavior of employers and firms. That is, the funds taken by an unemployed
individual from his/her UISA directly reduces the individual's personal wealth by an equal
amount, so that individuals fully internalize the cost of unemployment compensation. UISA
systems are not without risks, and special interventions are likely to be needed to protect those
workers who tend to be younger, poorer, and less well educated. Although the redistributive
impact of a UISA-based system would probably be smaller than the redistributive impact of
Chile's current unemployment assistance system, the complementary unemployment assistance
component of system would still be highly redistributive.
Chile's High Growth Economy: Povertv and Income Distribution, 1987-1998 211
REFERENCES
Andolfatto, D., and P. Gomme. 1996. "Unemployment Insurance and Labor Market Activity in
Canada." Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 44.
iAlvarez, F., and M. Veracierto. 1998. "Search, Self-Insurance and Job-Security Provisions."
Department of Economics, University of Chicago.
inderson, P.M. and B.D. Meyer. 1993. "Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Layoff
Incentives and Cross-Subsidies". Journal of Labor Economics. 11.
Beyer, H. 2000. "Seguro de Desempleo: Elementos para la Discusi6n." Puntos de Referencia
222. Centro de Estudios Puiblicos.
Brown, E., and H. Kaufold. 1988. "Human Capital Accumulation and the Optimal Level of
Unemployment Insurance Proyision". Journal of Labor Economics. 6.
Coloma, F. 1993. "Seguro de Desempleo: Teoria, Evidencia y una Propuesta." Documento de
Trabajo, Universidad Cat6lica.
4Coloma, F. 2000. "Seguro de Desempleo: Analisis y Propuesta." Puntos de Referencia 221.
Centro de Estudios Puiblicos.
Cortazar, R. , C. Echeverria, and P. Gonzalez. 1995. "Hacia un Nuevo Disefno de Sistemas de
Protecci6n de Cesantes." Colecci6n Estudios CIEPLAN No. 40.
Costain, J. S. 1999. "Unemployment Insurance with Endogenous Search Intensity and
Precautionary Saving." Working Paper No. 43. Department of Economics, Universitat
Pompeu Fabra.
Chiu, W. H., and E. Karni. 1998. "Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment
Insurance." Journal of Political Economy 106.
Davidson, C., and S. A. Woodbury. 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance." Journal of
Public Economics 64.
Feldstein, M., and D. Altman. 1998. "Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts". NBER
Working Paper 6860.
Fredriksson, P., and B. Holmlund. 1998. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search
Equilibrium." Department of Economics. Uppsala University.
Green, D.A. and W.C. Riddell.. 1993. "The Economic Effects of Unemployment Insurance in
Canada: An Empirical Analysis of Unemployment Insurance Disentitlement." Journal of
Labor Economics 11.
Gruber, J. 1997. "The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance."
American Economic Review 87.
212 Chile's High Growth Economy: Povertv and Income Distribution 1987-1998
Guasch, J. 2000. "An Alternative to Traditional Unemployment Insurance Programs: A
Liquidity-Based Approach Against the Risk of Earning Losses." World Bank.
Hansen, G. D., and A. Imrohoroglu. 1992. "The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an
Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard." Journal of Political Economy. .100.
Hausmann, R., and H. Reisen. 1996. "Securing Stability and Growth in Latin America: Policy
Issues and Prospects for Shock-Prone Economies." OECD.
Hopenhayn, H. A., and J. P. Nicolini. 1997. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance." Journal of
Political Economy 105.
Hopenhayn, H. A., and J. P. Nicolini. 1999. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance and
Employment History." Unpublished manuscript.
Hopenhayn, H. A. 2000. "Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts: Optimal?" University of
Rochester and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
Meyer, B. D. 1990. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells." Econometrica 58.
Mizala, A., and P. Romaguera. 1993. "Seguro de Desempleo y Flexibilidad del Mercado
Laboral: Evaluaci6n de la Experiencia Chilena y Analisis de Sistemas Alternativos." Informe
Fondecyt.
Mizala, A, P. Romaguera, and Henriquez. 1998 "Oferta Laboral y Seguro de Desempleo:
Estimaciones para la Economia Chilena." Serie Economia No. 28. Universidad de Chile:
Centro de Economia Aplicada, Departamento de Ingenieria Industrial.
Orszag, J., and D. Snower. 1997. "From Unemployment Benefits to Unemployment Accounts."
Birkbech College, London.
Pallage, S., and C. Zimmermann. 1997. "Moral Hazard and Optimal Unemployment Insurance in
an Economy with Heterogeneous Skills." Working Paper No. 54. Montreal: CREFE,
Universite du Quebec.
Paredes, R. 2000. "Reflexiones en torno al Proyecto de Seguro de Desempleo." Universidad de
Chile: Departamento de Economfa.
Usami, Y. 1983. "Payroll-Tax Financed Unemployment Insurance with Human Capital." Ph.D.
dissertation. MIT.
Valdivia, V. 1996. "Policy Evaluation in Heterogeneous Agent Economies: The Welfare Impact
of Unemployment Insurance." PhD Thesis. Northwestern University: Department of
Economics.
Wang, C., and S. Williamson. 1996. "Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a
Dynamic Economy." Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 44.
'hile 's Hiph Growth Economv: Povertv and Income Distribution. 1987-1998 213
Zhang, G-J. 1996. "Unemployment Insurance Analysis in a Search Economy." Canada.
University of Guelph: Department of Economics.
